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PREFLIGHT

In July of 2006, American Airlines and its pilots, represented by the
Allied Pilots Association, opened negotiations in an attempt to reach
a new Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") to supersede the
highly concessionary agreement forced upon the pilots in 2003 under
pressure to keep the company solvent.' The pilots are seeking significant improvements to work rules and compensation including a restoration in pay equivalent to 1992 hourly rates corrected for inflation (a
1. Allied Pilots Ass'n, Negotiations Overview, http://www.apanegotiations.com/
Overview/tabid/80/Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 6, 2008).
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nearly 55% increase from the current hourly pay rates).2 Because the
current negotiating environment is overtly anti-labor as a result of executive implementation and judicial interpretation of the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"), these negotiations, and those involving other
airline labor unions, are likely to be onerous and lengthy.
Due to a developing bias against labor in the execution of the statutory negotiating procedure and the resulting negotiating imbalance
between labor unions and airline management, the legislature and the
National Mediation Board ("NMB") should revisit the application of
the RLA and take remedial action with regard to collective bargaining
in the airline industry. Because labor tends to be the party seeking
changes to the status quo during normal contract negotiations, the recent implementation of the RLA provisions by the NMB, coupled
with recent court decisions interpreting the collective bargaining provisions contained in the RLA, have significantly tilted the bargaining
balance in favor of airline management and against airline labor unions. Recent judicial decisions regarding: (1) managements' ability to
unilaterally change the status quo by rejecting collective bargaining
agreements (CBAs) in bankruptcy reorganization; (2) the courts' limitations on the unions' use of strikes and other self-help strategies to
defend the rejection of contracts during bankruptcy proceedings; (3)
the courts' concurrence with NMB's use of compulsory, indefinite recess during mediation; and (4) the courts' creation of a bifurcated
standard regarding the requirement for the parties to maintain the status quo during negotiations for amendments to the CBAs will seriously erode the ability of airline unions to timely and legally use
economic leverage. This will be a critical disadvantage as labor seeks
to remedy the effects of extremely concessionary agreements that
management forced upon them early this decade as the result of the
bankruptcy or near bankruptcy of nearly every major airline in the
United States. The imbalance created by the NMB's implementation
of the bargaining provisions of the RLA, combined with these court
decisions will significantly (and negatively for labor) impact the bargaining process during future negotiations. The NMB implementation
and judicial decisions are just the most recent indications that the
RLA is an inappropriate and ineffective statutory framework for pilot
union/airline management negotiations.
Because the NMB implementation and court decisions virtually ensure that the RLA does not meet all the goals set out in the legislation, Congress should amend the RLA to thwart the effect of these
decisions or it should consider applying provisions similar to those in
the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") that ensure a more balanced and efficient bargaining environment. Possible areas for change
2. ALLIED PILOTS ASSOCIATION, UNDERSTANDING THE APA PAY RESTORATION PROPOSAL 2 (2007), http://www.apanegotiations.com (follow "Hot Items" tab;
then follow the "Understanding the APA Pay Restoration" hyperlink).
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include: (1) allowing airline CBAs to expire on their amendable date,
(2) allowing self-help any time the parties are at impasse after the
expiration date, (3) establishing a timeline for negotiation that includes the mediation process as outlined in the RLA but that leads to
predictable and reasonable timing for negotiations, and (4) applying
§ 1167 of the Bankruptcy Act, which disallows the rejection of rail
industry CBAs, to airlines as well as railroads, thereby mitigating the
imbalance in bargaining power that occurs when airlines opt to reorganize under Chapter Eleven of the U. S. Bankruptcy Code.
This comment will: (1) contrast the divergent statutory bargaining
provisions implemented in the RLA and NLRA, (2) discuss how the
NMB's application of the RLA combined with court interpretation of
RLA provisions negatively impacts labor unions' leverage in the collective bargaining process, and (3) suggest potential solutions to balance the negotiating dynamic in the airline industry while still serving
the legislative purposes enumerated in the RLA.
II.

RLA-BARGAINING

WITH A STATUTORY

HEADWIND V.

NRLA-NEGOTIATING WITH A LEGISLATIVE TAILWIND

Most industries negotiate CBAs under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).3 Congress specifically exempted railroad and airline agreements from the NLRA, which are instead negotiated under
the RLA.4 Although the NRLA and RLA diverge significantly in
many areas, for the purpose of this comment it is important for the
reader to understand only a few key differences between the collective bargaining processes required under the Acts.
A.

Collective Bargaining under the RLA - Low and Slow

Congress enacted the RLA5 in 1926 and in 1936 it amended the
RLA to include the burgeoning airline industry.6 The RLA provides
a broad framework and a statutorily-required checklist for resolution
of labor disputes and collective contract bargaining. 7 The general purposes of the RLA are enumerated in §151a. This comment focuses
specifically on the RLA's requirements "to avoid interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier engaged therein," and "to
provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules or working conditions."8 The RLA further requires the parties to "exert every reasonable effort to make and
3. See ABA SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOMENT
Acr 2 (Michael E. Abram et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005).

LAW, THE RAILWAY LABOR

4. Id.

5. Ry. Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151-88 (2000).
6. ABA SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT

LAW,

supra note 3.

7. Id.

8. 45 U.S.C. § 151a (emphasis added).
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maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working
conditions." 9
The RLA establishes a statutory procedure that the NMB and the
parties must follow during bargaining.' ° No party can engage in selfhelp or vary from the status quo before the process is complete."
CBAs in the airline industry do not expire; they become amendable
on a date agreed to by the parties and they are self-renewing on an
annual basis unless either party gives written notice of intent to amend
the contract at least thirty days before the amendable date. 1 2 Upon
notice, the parties must engage in direct bargaining in an attempt to
reach an agreement.' 3 Under § 155, at any time during the process
either or both parties may petition the NMB to provide mediation
assistance in bargaining.1 4 The NMB may also unilaterally implement
this provision to prevent a "labor emergency."' 5 The NMB then
dockets the case and assigns a mediator(s) to assist in the negotiations. 6 The mediator has wide latitude with regard to mediation techniques and the duration of the mediation process. 7 If the NMB
determines that the mediation is unlikely to result in an agreement, it
will declare an impasse and subsequently proffer binding arbitration
to the parties. 8 The parties are not statutorily required to accept the
arbitration proffer and if either party rejects arbitration, the NMB will
release the parties into a 30-day "cooling off" period. 9 Normally, the
parties are free to engage in self-help or vary the status quo at the
completion of the "cooling off" period. Under the RLA, the term
"self-help" encompasses a continuum of economic leverage activities
up to and including a general union strike or management lockout.20
If the NMB determines that the dispute will "threaten substantially to
interrupt interstate commerce to a degree such as to deprive any section of the country of essential transportation service," it may recommend that the President create a Presidential Emergency Board
("PEB") to investigate the dispute and make a recommendation
within thirty days of its creation.2 ' PEB recommendations are not
binding, and if either party does not accept the PEB recommendation
another 30-day "cooling off" period ensues and the parties may subse9. Id. § 152 (emphasis added).
10. See generally ABA SECION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 3, at
322-41 (discussing the statutory negotiating process).
11. See 45 U.S.C. § 155.
12. ABA SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 3, at 323.
13. Id. at 325.
14. 45 U.S.C. § 155.
15. Id.
16. ABA SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 3, at 327.
17. Id. at 328-29.
18. Id. at 329.
19. Id. at 330.
20. Id. at 14-17.
21. 45 U.S.C. § 160 (2007).
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quently engage in self-help.2 2 The PEB recommendation marks the
end of the statutorily required negotiation process.2 3 In the railroad
industry, Congress has occasionally passed legislation mandating binding arbitration or implementing a PEB recommendation,
but Con24
gress has rarely intervened in an airline industry dispute.
B.

RLA Compared with the NRLA - The Blimp and the Turbojet

Concerning the procedures for collective bargaining, there are several important differences between the NLRA and RLA. Under the
RLA, unions may not engage in self-help while a CBA is in effect.
In contrast, under the NRLA, unions may engage in self-help at any
time absent preclusive provisions in the CBA.2 6 More importantly,
CBAs negotiated under the NRLA generally have specific expiration
dates, while RLA CBAs have amendable dates.2 7 Parties governed by
the NRLA may engage in self-help and vary the status quo anytime
after "good faith" negotiations are at "impasse." 2 8 Finally, the NRLA
does not mandate mediation or other government intervention in the
negotiation process.
Historically, the duration of NRLA negotiations for amended
agreements is significantly less than for airline industry negotiations
under the RLA.29 During the period from 1994 to 1999, 74% of all
NRLA contract negotiations settled within one month of the expiration date, while only 11% of airline negotiations resulted in new
agreements within one month of the amendable date.3 0 In fact, from
1982 to 2002 more than 90% of all major airline negotiations failed to
reach an agreement within one month of the amendable date. 3 Almost 50% of airline negotiations required NMB mediation and the
average negotiation duration was more than nineteen months.3 2
While less than 2% of those negotiations necessitated a PEB, the average duration of those negotiations exceeded three years.3 3 Trends
show more airline negotiations are going into the mediation phase and
the average duration of those negotiations is increasing. 34 Prompt resolution of disputes is only one purpose of the RLA, but the statistics
show that compared to the NRLA, the RLA does not achieve that
22. ABA SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 3, at 340.
23. Id. at 337.
24. Id. at 340.
25. Id. at 14-15.
26. Id. at 15.
27. Id. at 15.
28. See id. at 15.
29. See Andrew von Nordendflycht & Thomas A. Kochan, Labor Contract Negotiations in the Airline Industry, MONTHLY LAB. REV., July 2003, at 21.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 22.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 27.
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goal. 3 5 There were, however, only six strikes (3%) in the airline industry from 1982 to 2002,36 so the RLA seems to satisfy its purpose of
preventing negotiations-related disruption to the transportation system and commerce. The difference in success in these conflicting purposes of the RLA indicates a bias favoring preventing disruption to
commerce at the expense of failing, in many airline cases, to resolve
CBA disputes promptly.
Statistics show that this bias is already reflected in the NMB's execution of its statutory duties. 37 Besides the delay that is inherent in
the NMB's implementation of the RLA requirements, recent court
decisions have either created additional inequities or exacerbated the
imbalance between labor and management power during negotiations.
The courts' rulings will likely have considerable impact on the next
round of airline industry negotiations.

III.

RLA

JUDICIAL DECISIONS - BARGAINING
IN A HOLDING PATTERN

A.

The RLA's Midair Collision with the Bankruptcy Act

Bankruptcy has always been part of the business life cycle for many
airlines. Since industry deregulation in 1978 there have been more
than 100 airline bankruptcies. 38 Some airlines have declared bankruptcy more than once in that period. 39 The situation became especially acute during and after 2002 when a post-9/11 industry downturn
combined with weak industry economics forced many of the major air
carriers into bankruptcy or near-bankruptcy.4 n
As part of the bankruptcy process, airline management may abrogate CBAs by rejecting them under § 1113. 1 Alternatively, the railroad industry is covered by a unique and contrary provision of the
Bankruptcy Code, § 1167.42 This provision specifically implicates the
RLA and mandates that management cannot reject railroad labor
contracts during the bankruptcy process without following the specific
provisions delineated in the RLA.4 3 The net effect of this provision is
that it obligates both management and labor to maintain the contractual status quo during bankruptcy proceedings. Consequently, railroad management cannot use Chapter Eleven to reject its labor
35. Id. at 21-22.
36. Id. at 22.
37. Id. at 21-22.
38. AIR TRANSP. ASs'N, INC., U.S. AIRLINE BANKRUPTCIES & SERVICE CESSA-

http://www.airlines.org/economics/specialtopics/USAirlineBankruptcies.htm
(last visited Jan. 25, 2008).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2000).
42. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1167 (2000).
43. See id.

TIONS,
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contracts unilaterally as part of a financial reorganization.44 Since this
is a railroad specific exception, the courts have held that § 1167 does
not apply to airlines (even though it is the only other industry covered
by the RLA). Therefore, airlines may reject their labor contracts in
bankruptcy by following the provisions prescribed in § 1113 of the
Bankruptcy Code.4 5 If pre-rejection negotiation between the union
and management fails, the court will approve the rejection of a labor
contract under § 1113(c) if: (1) the company makes a proposal necessary to permit a fair and equitable reorganization, (2) the union refuses the proposal without "good cause," and (3) the "balance of the
equities favor the rejection. '4 6 This has been a fairly easy standard for
airline management to meet because the court does not analyze "good
cause" from the union's perspective but instead defers to the company's interest in insuring the success of reorganization by reducing its
labor costs.47 Management merely needs to show that the changes are
necessary for reorganization; the presumption is with management
and the legal burden placed on labor to avoid rejection is severe. 48
In 1984, the Supreme Court affirmed in NLRB v. Bildisco 49 that a
company could reject its CBAs, just as it could any executory contract,
without prospective bargaining with the union.5 ° Congress subsequently enacted 11 U.S.C. § 1113. This provision at least obligated
some negotiations with the union before a bankruptcy judge could approve modification or rejection of the CBA.51' The courts have applied up to nine factors when determining whether to allow rejection
of a CBA.52 The factors are based on the three provisions found in
§ 1113(c) discussed above. Although § 1113(c) does require some
bargaining, the recent experience in airline bankruptcies has demonstrated that management will almost always be able to meet its burden
and get court approval to reject their labor agreements.5 3 The Bankruptcy Code has also established a strict and swift timeline for prerejection negotiations that ultimately allows management to move forward with rejection absent a timely agreement with the union. 54 Most
recently in the cases of Northwest Airlines, Mesaba Airlines, and
Comair,unions have challenged managements' attempts to reject con44. ABA SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 3, at 498.
45. See In re Delta Air Lines, Inc., 359 B.R. 491, 498 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007); In re
Air Florida System, Inc., 48 B.R. 440, 443 (Bankr. D. Fla. 1985).
46. 11 U.S.C. §1113.
47. See In re Salt Creek Freightways, 47 B.R. 835, 840 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985).
48. Id.
49. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
50. Id. at 489.
51. ABA SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 3, at 500; 11
U.S.C. § 1113.
52. In re Nat'l Forge Co., 289 B.R. 803, 809-10 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2003).
53. See In re Delta Air Lines, Inc., 359 B.R. 491, 509 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
54. 11 U.S.C. § 1113.
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tracts.5 5 In each case, the courts have held that if management follows

the procedures in § 1113(c), the burden shifts to labor to overcome a
presumption that the carrier acted in "good faith" negotiating a "necessary" pre-rejection proposal and a further presumption the union
acted in "bad faith" by refusing the proposal without "good cause." 5 6
Because these presumptions are weighed against the economic necessity for financial reorganization and not what the union deems is in
the best interest of its membership, management almost uniformly
succeeds in its bid to reject contracts or to get unions to concede in
lieu of a complete rejection of the CBA.5 7
Concerning the duty to maintain the status quo, the RLA and the
Bankruptcy Code are in philosophical conflict. The RLA encom-

passes a comprehensive duty to maintain the status quo until the statutory process is complete.58 Presumably this avoids unnecessary
disruption to the transportation system. Conversely, the Bankruptcy
Code allows airline management to change the status quo unilaterally,

on a short timeline, as part of the reorganization process.
B.

Right to Strike During Bankruptcy - A Judicially
Ordered "Go-around"

During the latest round of airline bankruptcy proceedings several

unions threatened with rejections of their CBAs sought to engage in
self-help. The legal theory was that since management was not maintaining the status quo as required under the RLA, then the union no
longer had a reciprocal duty and could engage in self-help.5 9 With the

exception of one decision involving the NWA flight attendants that

was subsequently overturned on appeal,6" the courts have uniformly

enjoined labor self-help subsequent to bankruptcy rejection of a
CBA.6 '
Because the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
prevent the federal courts from intervening in non-violent labor disputes, 62 the courts have sought to enjoin self-help activity under the

55. See In re Nw. Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. 307, 315 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re
Mesaba Aviation, Inc., 350 B.R. 112, 117 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2006); In re Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 359 B.R. at 495 (Bankr. D.N.Y. 2007).
56. See In re Delta, 359 B.R. at 494.
57. See In re Nw. Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. at 307; In re Mesaba Aviation, Inc., 350
B.R. at 138; In re Delta Air Lines, Inc., 359 B.R. at 495.
58. Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142,
151-52 (1969).
59. See In re Nw. Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. at 307; In re Mesaba Aviation, Inc., 350
B.R. at 128; In re Delta Air Lines, Inc., 359 B.R. at 495.
60. In re Nw. Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. 333, 345-46 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006), rev'd,
349 B.R. 338 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006), affd, 483 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2007).
61. See In re Nw. Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. at 307; In re Mesaba Aviation, Inc., 350
B.R. at 138; In re Delta Air Lines, Inc., 359 B.R. at 495.
62. Norris-LaGuardia Act (NLGA), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-110 (West 1998).
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auspices of the RLA.6 3 Although each court decided to intervene and
enjoin post-rejection self-help, the decisions were based on significantly divergent reasoning. The Northwest court held that the CBA
no longer existed after rejection and that the union and management
were compelled to negotiate a "new" agreement following the complete procedure outlined in the RLA.6 4 The Delta court held that rejection simply meant that management did not need to perform under
the contract and that the union was still bound to maintain the status
quo under the current contract until released by the NMB. 65 In
Mesaba and Delta, the courts seem to have applied a "bad faith" test
to the decision to enjoin.66 Absent a showing of "bad faith" on the
part of management by making more than the minimum changes required for restructuring, the courts would enjoin self-help.6 7 These
decisions seem to leave the door open for the possible use of self-help
after contract rejection if a union can prove that management made
changes to the status quo that were not reasonably necessary. The
union would have to overcome the presumption that management rejected the contract in good faith while the union refused to accept the
changes without good cause.6" This has been a difficult trial burden.
The courts have largely remedied the conflict between the Bankruptcy Code and the RLA in favor of management. The courts have
allowed management to use Chapter Eleven bankruptcy reorganization as a tool for what amounts to unilateral changes to or complete
rejection of CBAs. After giving management relief from the status
quo by applying the contrary bankruptcy code, the courts have then
flip-flopped and used the provisions of the RLA to enforce the status
quo requirements on the affected labor unions.6 9 Basically, the courts
have allowed management to operate outside the auspices of the RLA
during bankruptcy reorganization while requiring that the unions maneuver within the RLA during the same period. The effect of bankruptcy and management's ability to reject CBAs as part of the process
has been catastrophic for airline labor agreements. 7' Labor has
largely been left with no choice but to negotiate extremely concessionary agreements in the face of the potentially worse option of whole63. See In re Nw. Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. at 307; In re Mesaba Aviation, Inc., 350
B.R. at 127-30; In re Delta Air Lines, Inc., 359 B.R. at 495 (where the courts enjoin
under the RLA to avoid conflict with Norris-LaGuardia).
64. In re Nw. Airlines Corp., 483 F.3d 160, 173-74 (2d Cir. 2007).
65. In re Delta Air Lines, Inc., 359 B.R. 491, 505 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
66. See In re Delta Air Lines, Inc., 359 B.R. at 505; In re Mesaba Aviation, Inc.,
350 B.R. at 138-39.
67. See id.
68. In re Mesaba Aviation, Inc., 350 B.R. at 138-39.
69. See In re Delta Air Lines, Inc., 359 B.R. at 505; In re Mesaba Aviation, Inc.,
350 B.R. at 138-39.
70. See ECLAT CONSULTING INC., AIRLINE CONCESSIONS TIMELINE 2, available at
http://www.eclatconsulting.com/im-pdf/airline-labor-concessionssummary.pdf
(last
visited on Jan. 25, 2008).
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sale rejection of the CBA under § 1113(c). The mere threat of
bankruptcy proceedings is generally enough to get labor unions to
agree to concessionary deals7 because the courts have demonstrated
that they typically allow management to reject labor contracts without
any counter-balancing threat of labor self-help. The unions were compelled to minimize the damage and live to fight another day.
Since 2002, nearly all major carriers with the exception of Southwest Airlines have used bankruptcy or the threat of bankruptcy to
extort hugely concessionary contracts from union leadership.7 2 For
example, when American Airlines told its unions that it would declare
bankruptcy on a specific date absent membership assent to highly concessionary changes to the CBA, all three unions acquiesced rather
than face the possibility of management rejection of the CBAs as a
result of § 1113(c). 7 3 US Airways, Delta, United, Northwest, American, and Continental (five of the six largest carriers in the country)
were able to leverage labor concessions worth billions of dollars individually, and tens of billions industry-wide. Management essentially
avoided the last round of industry RLA negotiations by replacing
them with the unfettered and management-friendly bankruptcy
process. 4
The recent wave of bankruptcies and near-bankruptcies has set up a
unique dynamic for the next round of negotiations. During the next
three years almost all of the CBAs between the major carriers and
their unions will become amendable.7 5 This does not account for any
regional carriers or the railroads, which also negotiate under the
RLA. Some carriers will have multiple contracts with each of their
unions amendable on the same day. American Airlines, for example,
is in negotiations with all three unions on the property at the same
time, because all of the CBAs at American were amendable as of May
1, 2008.76
In addition to the sheer number of contracts that will be in the negotiation phase, expectations are that with few exceptions, the airline
labor unions are likely to tailor their bargaining proposals to recoup
the concessions of the past few years and seek to make real improvements to their contracts, particularly with regard to compensation and
pensions.7 7 The airlines themselves, of course, will be attempting to
71. Id. at 1-2.
72. Id.
73. CBC News.ca, Flight Attendants Accept Concessions, American Airlines
Avoids Bankruptcy, Apr. 16, 2003, http://www.cbc.ca/money/story/2003/O4/16/amerair
030416.html#skip300x250.
74. ECLAT CONSULTING INC., supra note 70, at 1.
75. ECLAT CONSULTING INC., NETWORK AND Low COST CARRIER LABOR CONTRACT AMENDABLE DATES, available at http://www.eclatconsulting.com/im-pdf/contractamendabledates_605.pdf (last visited on Jan. 25, 2008).
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Allied Pilots Ass'n, Negotiations Overview, supra note 1.
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maintain the cost savings they were able to achieve during bankruptcy
negotiations. The airline industry has largely recovered from the post9/11 financial crisis that led to bankruptcies, even considering the significant increase in fuel cost.78 With the industry in a relatively
healthy financial situation, the bulk of negotiations will be under the
RLA process and should be quite contentious because there will be a
large chasm between the goals and initial negotiating positions of the
parties.
The RLA requires that the parties maintain the status quo during
negotiations. For this round of bargaining, based on the current financial and labor dynamics, airline management will assume that new
CBAs will result in significantly higher labor costs than the contracts
they negotiated during bankruptcy. The American Airlines pilots,
represented by the Allied Pilots Association, for example, recently
proposed pay increases in excess of 50% that would restore their pay
rates to the 1992 rates adjusted for inflation.7 9 Assuming other unions
also seek to restore their pay rates to pre-bankruptcy levels, it should
be apparent that airline management will largely be happy with maintaining the status quo for as long as possible. The RLA is structurally
designed to prefer the status quo and, because the RLA leads to extended negotiations, the process is again weighted in management's
favor. Because the current financial climate and bankruptcy-created
contracts result in high union expectation for improvements, it is
likely that management will dig in and extend negotiations to maintain the status quo as long as possible or until the industry financial
dynamic shifts towards their favor. Since most union contracts require
membership ratification, it is safe to assume that the membership will
require significant improvements in new CBAs to gain ratification.
Management used bankruptcy to shift the negotiating dynamic to
their favor during the last round and the union does not have any nonRLA alternative to counter-balance. Consequently, playing out the
entire RLA process is the only likely scenario for this round of negotiations. This is problematic for at least two reasons.
First, the NMB is ill-prepared to take scores of negotiations through
the mediation process. The mediation division of the NMB employs
only twelve mediators, and more than one mediator is often assigned
to each case. 80 These twelve mediators must cover all negotiations in
78. John Heimlich, 2008 Outlook: "A Global Perspective," http://www.airlines.
org/economics/review andoutlook/ATA2008EconOutlookOpEd.htm (last visited
Mar. 1, 2008).
79. ALLIED PILOTS Ass'N, UNDERSTANDING THE APA PAY RESTORATION PROPOSAL 2 (2007), http://www.apanegotiations.com/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=JRh7r3u
Vt80%3d&tabid=65&mid=448.
80. Joshua M. Javits, Arbitrator & Mediator, Nat'l Acad. Of Arbitrators 2007 Annual Meeting, Airline Mediation: Becalming Brewing Battles 5 (May 25, 2007), http://
www.dispute-resolution.biz/pdf/AIRLINEMEDIATION_2007-NAA-Mtg.pdf.
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the railroad industry as well as airline industry.8 The NMB budget
has been stagnant for many years and does not allow for quick expansion." 'Me dearth of resources at the NMB is likely to result in delays
for any negotiations which require mediation services.
Second, since the concessionary contracts from the last round are
the status quo and contracts with significant improvements will be
necessary for union ratification, there is little or no overlap in negotiating positions. The use of self-help, authorized near the end of the
RLA process is the only real tool labor or management will have to
close the chasm between negotiating positions. Since legal self-help
cannot happen until after mediation and a proffer of binding arbitration, negotiations are more likely to extend deep into the RLA process during this round. Once again, this works against the party
attempting to change the status quo, in this case, labor.
Recent court decisions upholding the ability of management to reject CBAs during bankruptcy and further decisions limiting or denying
labor unions use of self-help to counter the unilateral changes to the
status quo have led directly to extremely concessionary contracts in
the airline industry over the last few years. This situation has created
a dynamic that will tax the NMB infrastructure and make it less likely
that RLA contract disputes will be solved in a timely manner as mandated by the legislature. 83 The NMB's inherent shortcomings will further skew the negotiating balance in management's favor.
C.

NMB Mediation - All Drag and No Thrust

The RLA outlines specific statutory duties for the parties and the
NMB during the collective bargaining process.8 4 Specifically, § 152 of
the RLA requires the parties to "exert every reasonable effort to
make and maintain agreements... and to settle all disputes... in order
to avoid disruption to commerce.
",85 The courts have generally
treated this directive as the primary statutory provision in the RLA.8 6
This language is a word for word repeat of one of the five general
purpose statements specifically delineated in § 151a of the RLA.8"
Another primary purpose enumerated in the RLA is "to provide for
the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes concerning rates of
pay, rules, or working conditions." 8 8 Recent NMB implementation
and judicial decisions demonstrate an apparent disregard for this legislative provision. By including such a statement in the RLA, Congress
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 4-12.
84. Ry. Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 152, 155 (2000).
85. Id. § 152.
86. See Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142,
148-54 (1969).
87. 45 U.S.C. § 151a.
88. Id.
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obviously intended for the NMB to execute the terms of the RLA
such that labor disputes are settled promptly.8 9 Although the RLA
does not indicate in its language that any one of the specific purpose
provisos takes precedence over another, close examination of the negotiation statistics presented above and judicial history of cases
brought under the RLA indicates an executive and judicial discount
for the prompt settlement provision. 90
The NMB's execution of the mediation process favors a party seeking to maintain the status quo. 91 In general, this favors management
since labor unions almost always seek improvements in the contract.
Also, the last round of concessionary contracts will likely ensure that
labor unions, trying to regain lost ground, will seek significant and
costly improvements to their CBAs in the near future.
The RLA does not require federal mediation during negotiations,
but if the parties do not reach an agreement they will either end up in
mediation by request or by NMB compulsion before being released to
exercise self-help. 92 RLA § 155 outlines the mediation procedure. 93
The NMB will docket a dispute for mediation on request from one or
both parties or if at any time it finds a labor emergency exists. 94 The
NMB will continue mediation efforts until such a time as it proffers
binding arbitration. 95 The RLA specifies that the NMB will proffer
binding arbitration if it determines "efforts to bring about an amicable
settlement through mediation shall be unsuccessful." 96 The RLA does
not contain any further guidance for the methods or a timeline for the
mediation process. Consequently, there have been several court cases
trying to define the breadth of the NMB's authority and the timing of
the mediation process. 97
Federal courts have generally held that the NMB has complete control of the statutory mediation process.9 8 The courts have been loath
to question the NMB's judgment in mediation cases and will defer to
its judgment absent a finding of "patent official bad faith."9 9 In Teamsters v. NMB, the company and the train dispatchers had been in RLA
§ 155 mediation for more than two years without reaching an amicable agreement. 01 0 Although the trial court ordered the NMB to terminate mediation and offer binding arbitration, the appeals court
89. See ABA

SECTrION OF LABOR

& EMPLOYMENT

LAW,

supra note 3,at 61.

90. See discussion supra.
91. See Detroit & Toledo Shore R.R., 396 U.S. at 148-50.
92. 45 U.S.C. § 155.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See id.
96. Id.
97. See discussion infra.
98. See, e.g., Local 808, Bldg. Maint., Serv. & R.R. Workers v. Nat'l Mediation
Bd., 888 F.2d 1428, 1429-30 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
99. Id. at 1430.
100. Id.
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reversed, holding that the court is in no position to second-guess the
NMB, that the duration of the mediation was not unduly long, and
that the NMB's decision was not "patently unreasonable."' 10 1 The
court also noted that no court had ever ordered the termination of
mediation and that several courts had refused to do so.' 2 In Machinists v. NMB, a railroad union sued the NMB because it refused to
release the parties from mediation and allow the union to exercise
self-help. 0 3 The parties engaged in direct negotiations for ten
months, followed by ten months of NMB-mediated discussions.' 4
Even after all parties agreed that mediation had failed and they had
reached an impasse, the NMB insisted on intensified mediation for an
additional four months.' 0 5 Once again, the court did not intervene,
holding the NMB action was not "patently arbitrary" and that the mediation period was not "patently unreasonable."' 0' 6 In Dispatchers v.
Ft. Smith Railroad, it was management that wanted to be released
from mediation because it felt the proceedings had reached an impasse and it questioned the techniques (such as changes in venue) that
the NMB employed.' 0 7 The court ordered the railroad to return to
the negotiating table, holding that the NMB had the authority to experiment with any mediation device it thought might lead to an agreement as long as the method chosen did not offend other laws.'0 8 Each
of these decisions demonstrates the deference the court gives to the
NMB in determining the duration and the methods used in the arbitration process. The NMB continues to demonstrate, with court approval, that concern over disruption to the transportation system
trumps the apparently conflicting interest of promptly settling
disputes.
More recently, the court has sided with the NMB in determining
that the complete lack of mediation is a legitimate mediation technique."' In Grand Trunk v. NMB, the parties failed to come to agreement after direct and mediated discussions."' The NMB determined
that further negotiations would be fruitless because neither party was
willing to adjust its position."' (Author's note: Isn't this exactly what
the RLA defines as the criteria to offer binding arbitration when it
101. See generally id.
102. Id. at 1433.
103. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 930 F.2d 45, 46 (D.C. Cir.
1991).
104. Id. at 47.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 48.
107. Am. Train Dispatchers Dep't of the Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Fort
Smith R.R., 121 F.3d 267, 269 (7th Cir. 1997).
108. Id. at 268.
109. Grand Trunk W. R.R. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Employees Div., 497 F.3d 568
(6th Cir. 2007).
110. Id. at 570.
111. Id.
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says in § 155 that arbitration should be proffered when mediation efforts fail to bring about an amicable settlement?) Instead, the NMB
put the negotiations into an indefinite recess, requiring the parties to
significantly modify their bargaining positions before it would agree to
schedule any future bargaining sessions.' 12 Once again, the Grand
Trunk court sided with the NMB (and effectively with the party seeking to maintain the status quo) legitimizing indefinite recess as a mediation technique." 3
The NMB has now included a discussion of "indefinite recess" as a
mediation technique on the frequently-asked questions section of its
official web site." 4 The NMB also continues to use the technique frequently in railroad negotiations, and has demonstrated a willingness
to apply it to the airline industry as well. The NMB recessed the recent negotiations between the United Parcel Service and its pilots for
more than
four months before scheduling additional mediated
15
sessions.'
The net effect of the courts' deference to the NMB's mediation decisions is ever increasing durations for collective bargaining. The
NMB's prerogative to avoid declaring an impasse and subsequently
releasing the parties to self-help appears to be contrary to the black
letter of the statute. But the courts have consistently upheld the
NMB's position, signaling that there is no requirement for the NMB
to balance its execution to ensure all purposes of the RLA are met.
Instead the protection of commerce seems to supersede the requirement for prompt resolution of disputes.
This flies in the face of the parallel bargaining process under the
National Labor Relations Act, which balances the right to efficiently
resolve disputes with concerns regarding economic disruption."16 Automobile manufacturer/union negotiations often result in self-help and
new contracts are negotiated in weeks. Yet the RLA/NMB process
results in negotiations that often take years to complete1 17 (even
though a break in the production of automobiles arguably has a much
greater impact on the economy than the disruption to the operations
of one of the major airlines). Northwest Airlines was shut down by a
pilots strike for more than two weeks in the late 90s as was American
Airlines by a flight attendant strike in the early 90s.118 Other airlines
112. Id.
113. Id. at 572-73.
114. Nat'l Mediation Bd., Frequently-Asked Questions: Mediation, http://www.
nmb.gov/mediation/faq-mediation.html (last visited on Jan. 25, 2008).
115. Ed McKenna, UPS, Pilots Talks in Recess, AIR CARGO WORLD ONLINE, http://
www.aircargoworld.com/breaknews/07012005b.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2008).
116. Nat'l Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2000).
117. See Nordenflycht & Kochan, supra note 28, at 18, 21-22.
118. NAT'L MEDIATION BD., STRIKE REPORT: U.S. AIRLINES UNDER THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT, http://www.nmb.gov/publicinfo/airline-strikes.html
(last visited
Mar. 1, 2008).
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picked up the capacity lost by the striking carrier and neither strike
had an effect on the economy that should justify the NMB delaying
bargaining agreements for years.
D. Judicial Bifurcation of the RLA Status Quo StandardGrounding Labor While Management Flies High
Court interpretations have resulted in a judicial inconsistency regarding the parties' duty to maintain the status quo during negotiations.1 19 The RLA requires that the bargaining parties maintain the
status quo until they reach an agreement or until the NMB releases
them into self-help at the exhaustion of the statutory bargaining process. 2 ' In Shoreline, the court found the status quo requirement
serves ". . .to prevent a union from striking and management from
doing anything that would justify a strike." '' While the status quo
requirement certainly applies to the terms of the current CBA, the
courts have also determined that the requirement applies even more
broadly to the "objective working conditions and practices ... which
were in effect prior to the time the pending
dispute arose and which
1' 22
are involved in or related to that dispute.'
When determining whether a party has or is violating the status
quo, the courts first must determine whether the action constitutes a
major or a minor dispute.123 Minor disputes are not considered violations of the status quo and are subject to the RLA arbitration provisions. 24 Consequently, minor disputes fall outside the jurisdiction of
the courts.1 25 Violations of the status quo that rise to the level of a
major dispute do come under the jurisdiction of the court and the
party's actions that give rise to the dispute may be enjoined.' 2 6 Although the Norris-LaGuardia Act is implicated and generally precludes courts from issuing injunctions in pure labor disputes, the
Supreme Court has determined that the courts do have jurisdiction to
enforce the specific RLA provisions. 2 7
When determining whether management actions violate the status
quo, the courts base their analysis on two standards delineated in two
1989 Supreme Court cases decided within days of one another. First,
changes that are not implicated specifically in the current CBA provisions and that are the result of management prerogative decisions are
not considered changes to the status quo and do not engage any duty
119.
120.
121.
(1969).
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

See discussion infra.
Ry. Labor Act, 45 U.S.C., §§ 151, 155 (2000).
Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 296 U.S. 142, 150
Id. at 152-53.
See Conrail v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299, 300 (1989).
Id. at 305-06.
Id. at 303.
Id.
Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Chi. River & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30, 40-41 (1957).
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specified in the RLA.12 8 Second, in Conrail the court found that if
management can show that any changes can "arguably be justified" by
express or implied provisions in the current agreement then that
change is a minor dispute subject to arbitration, not a major dispute
subject to injunction or other court action. 129 The Supreme Court decision in Conrail specifically states that if a disputed action of either
party can arguably be justified by the agreement, it is not a status quo
violation.13 ° More recent case law appears to apply this standard only
to management
actions while applying a different standard to union
13 1
actions.
Specifically, the courts have generally held that if a union engages
in economic self-help prior to a release by the NMB then it has violated the status quo. 3 2 Although a strike prior to release would obviously violate the status quo, courts have held that any activity that has
the economic consequence of a strike is a violation.' 3 3 The court
looks at the potential or actual consequences of the action such 134
as
economic harm in the form of lost revenue or diminished goodwill.
The management and union court standard for maintaining the status
quo is therefore fundamentally different. There is no harm test for
management. If management's action can arguably be justified by a
provision in the contract it is a not a status quo violation even if it
causes harm to the union or a member. A union, on the other hand,
violates the status quo if there is any economic harm to the carrier,
regardless of whether that action could arguably be justified by a contract provision.
In a dispute during contentious contract negotiations between Delta
Airlines and its pilots, a decision by the 11th Circuit further widened
the chasm between the disparate status quo standards. In Delta Airlines v. Air Line Pilots Association ("ALPA"), 3 5 Delta asked the
court to order the union to stop its pilots from declining to accept
"volunteer overtime" flying. 1 36 ALPA contended that accepting overtime flying was optional and voluntary under the contract and applying the "arguably justifiable" standard the dispute was minor and
subject to arbitration, not the jurisdiction of the court. 1 37 ALPA argued further that the union had no role in persuading the pilots to
decline overtime and, in fact, complied with company requests to en128. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 490, 510
(1989).
129. Conrail, 491 U.S. at 306.

130. Id.
131. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. United Air Lines, Inc., 802 F.2d 886 (7th Cir.

1986).
132. Id. at 906-07.

133. Id.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at
Delta
Id. at
Id. at

906.
Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 238 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2001).
1301-03.
1307.
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courage the pilots to fly. 13 8 In an onerous ruling, the circuit court reversed the district court and ordered the judge to issue an injunction
in Delta's favor. 139 The appeals court reasoned that since Delta had
relied on pilots flying overtime to fill its schedule, the pilots' refusal to
fly overtime caused Delta economic harm and consequently represented a change to the status quo.140 The court came to this conclusion even though it acknowledged that the contract specifically stated
that overtime was to be flown at the pilots' option and there was little
evidence that the union organized or supported the pilots' decision
not to volunteer for overtime.' 4 '
This case particularly illustrates the different standards the court applies to labor and management when applying the status quo tests.
Presumably, the company and the union agreed to this provision when
they negotiated the contract. If the company had wanted the overtime flying provision to be mandatory it could have bargained for it.
If management did bargain for mandatory overtime, the union obviously prevailed and presumably gave up something else in bargaining
to keep the provision voluntary. It is interesting that under the "arguably justifiable" standard, if management had stopped offering
overtime flying to pilots then that change would constitute a minor
dispute, not a status quo violation. This seems to be an obvious
double standard that also gave Delta a second bite at the apple to get
what it was unable to get in the previous bargaining process. Once
again, this court ruling serves to avoid disruption to commerce at the
expense of a union's ability to use its legitimate contract leverage to
resolve a dispute promptly.
IV.

POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

- INCREASING LABOR'S

LIFT

AND

DIMINISHING NEGOTIATION DRAG

The airline industry collective bargaining system as it is now implemented is inefficient and does not serve all the purposes outlined in
the RLA. It sets up a negotiating dynamic wherein a party satisfied
with the status quo agreement will use the system to delay negotiations rather than to seek out a potential agreement that will meet the
needs of both parties. There are several possible solutions to correcting the imbalance that now exists between management and labor
in the RLA collective bargaining process. The solutions could be legislative, judicial, or executive. Since the courts have been so consistent in their decisions and the doctrine of stare decisis normally
precludes the courts from ruling against precedent, it is unlikely that
the courts will serve as the impetus for such change.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 1309-10.
Id. at 1311.
See id. at 1310.
See id.
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Legislatively, Congress could revise the RLA to correct the imbalance and make the negotiating process more efficient. It could certainly put the aviation industry under the NRLA and bring aviation
collective bargaining immediately in line with most other industries.
Absent a willingness to do that, Congress could modify the RLA to
make airline contracts expire on their amendable date. This would
force the parties to negotiate new agreements before expiration and
set an immediate timeline for resolution. Congress could define impasse and direct the NMB to release the parties when impasse is
reached. This would keep the NMB from using techniques, such as
"indefinite recess," to keep parties involved in unproductive negotiations, while maintaining the positive aspects of mediation assistance.
Congress could establish specific timelines for the various phases of
the bargaining process. For example, direct contract talks could begin
180 days before the amendable date; absent an agreement, mediation
would begin 120 days prior; at thirty days prior "cooling off" would
commence; and at the amendable date the parties would be authorized to use self-help. This would add certainty to the negotiating process, helping the parties, and the NMB design a negotiating plan likely
to result in a timelier and more satisfactory outcome. It would also
serve as an impetus to negotiate vigorously and in good faith to reach
agreement before self-help occurs with all its potentially negative consequences. To stabilize and balance the effect of bankruptcy-induced
CBA rejections, Congress could make § 1167 apply to airlines as well
as railroads. This would mandate use of the new and improved RLA
process before management could reject a CBA. The timelines could
be shortened to better fit the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
Congress could also amend § 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code to eliminate the presumptions against unions and balance the burdens of
bankruptcy between management and unions.' 4 2 Any or all of these
legislative solutions could add stability and a certainty to collective
bargaining in the airline industry. This would likely create a more
predictable and positive negotiating environment. Instead of depending on the system to protect positions, the parties would be forced to
negotiate productively or face the uncertain consequences of self-help.
At the executive level, the NMB could unilaterally implement many
of the suggested legislative solutions because the courts have held that
the NMB has nearly absolute control over the mediation process. The
NMB could encourage the parties to write bargaining timelines into
their agreements and agree to enforce them. The NMB could define
impasse and release parties to self-help thereby encouraging productive bargaining before that inevitability. The NMB could certainly
mediate on a timeline similar to the legislative example above. And
finally, the NMB could concentrate on creative mediation efforts to
142. See, e.g., Protecting Employees and Retirees in Business Bankruptcies Act,
H.R. 3652, 110th Cong. § 8 (2007).
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encourage meaningful bargaining, rather than on techniques designed
to delay.
A two-pronged solution-formulated in the short-term on unilateral improvements to the NMB's execution of current RLA provisions
and in the long-term on legislative effort to overhaul the RLA with a
more stable and certain statutory negotiating process-would ultimately better serve labor, management, and the industry as a whole.
Such a solution would be much more likely to serve the purposes that
are enumerated in the RLA.
V.

CONCLUSION FROM A UNION PERSPECTIVE AVOIDING HARD LANDINGS

An executive and judicial bias in the implementation of an outdated
and ineffective RLA has tilted the balance in the airline industry collective bargaining process toward management. In recent proceedings, the NMB has practiced a form of mediation designed more to
delay progress than to achieve agreements. The courts' bias toward
avoiding potential disruptions to commerce at the expense of the
prompt resolution of disputes is demonstrated by decisions that (1)
allow management a virtually unfettered ability to reject CBAs in
bankruptcy; (2) deny unions the ability to use strikes or other self-help
strategies to defend against bankruptcy contract rejections; (3) validate the NMB decisions to use "indefinite recess" and other questionable mediation techniques to delay self-help instead of encouraging
productive bargaining; and (4) create a bifurcated standard that disadvantages labor unions in status quo disputes.
Restoring balance to the RLA negotiating process would have the
added effect of increasing stability and certainty in airline labor relations. The NMB should deal with the problem in the short term by
unilaterally adding timelines and creative mediation techniques into
the process while minimizing delay tactics and encouraging more productive bargaining. The Legislature should overhaul the RLA to
bring it more in line with NRLA by replacing amendable dates with
expiration dates, making the mediation process more objective by defining impasse and establishing timelines, and protecting CBAs from
unilateral rejection without recourse during bankruptcy proceedings.
A thoughtful rebalancing of statutory negotiation and mediation procedures would ultimately better serve the unions, management, the
airline industry, and our mobile society.
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